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CARL SCHMITT AND THE CRITIQUE OF LAWFARE  
David Luban 
“Lawfare” is the use of law as a weapon of war against a military 
adversary. Lawfare critics complain that self-proclaimed “humanitarians” 
are really engaged in the partisan and political abuse of law—lawfare. This 
paper turns the mirror on lawfare critics themselves, and argues that the 
critique of lawfare is no less abusive and political than the alleged lawfare 
it attacks. Radical lawfare critics view humanitarian law with suspicion, as 
nothing more than an instrument used by weak adversaries against strong 
military powers. By casting suspicion on humanitarian law, they undermine 
disinterested argument, and ultimately undermine the validity of their own 
critique. The paper then explores the vision of politics and law underlying 
the lawfare critique through a reading of the most significant theorist who 
defends that vision, the German theorist Carl Schmitt. Through a reading 
and critique of Schmitt, the article examines both the force of the lawfare 
critique and its flaws. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
―Lawfare‖ is the use of law as a weapon of war against a military 
adversary. Law can be weaponized in many ways, but easiest is accusing 
the adversary of war crimes, thereby subjecting him to harassment through 
litigation and bad publicity. War crimes accusations are not the only method 
of lawfare, of course. The U.S. government lawyers who wrote the torture 
memos, contriving legal arguments to legitimize Central Intelligence Agen-
cy (CIA) torture, were engaged in lawfare of a different sort; indeed, John 
Yoo, the best-known of these lawyers, indirectly boasted about lawfare by 
titling his memoir War By Other Means,1 an ingenious twist on the Clause-
  
  University Professor and Professor of Law and Philosophy, Georgetown University 
Law Center. 
 1 JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER‘S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR 
(2006). 
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witizian dictum that war is politics by other means.  In his view, apparently, 
the law he practiced in his government service was war by other means, 
which is simply another name for lawfare. In other contexts as well, states 
can wage lawfare just as non-state actors can. Major General Charles J. 
Dunlap, Jr., who popularized the term ―lawfare,‖ points out that lawfare 
―can operate as a positive ‗good,‘‖ and details several examples in which 
the United States has substitut[ed] lawfare methodologies for traditional 
material means.2  My chief example of lawfare, though, will be accusations 
by non-state actors of war crimes by a powerful, modern army. That is sure-
ly what today‘s shouting is about. 
Although the term ―lawfare‖ can be used purely descriptively, as 
General Dunlap does, it usually is not.3 ―Lawfare‖ is a pejorative and po-
lemical word. To accuse someone of lawfare is to accuse them of something 
sneaky. There are two pieces to the accusation. First is the insinuation that 
those who wage lawfare are fighting by cowardly means. That was the im-
plication of a much-remarked sentence from the National Defense Strategy 
of the United States in 2002 and 2005: ―Our strength as a nation state will 
continue to be challenged by those who employ a strategy of the weak using 
international fora, judicial processes, and terrorism.‖4 Lumping judicial 
processes together with terrorism as part of a ―strategy‖ is equivalent to 
accusing those who take the United States government to court with lawfare 
of a particularly vile sort, and labeling lawfare ―a strategy of the weak‖ is a 
taunt. Why doesn‘t the enemy just come out and fight like real men, instead 
of pretending to be disinterested adherents to legality?  
Second, the lawfare accusation implicitly assumes that ―lawriors‖—
as I shall call those who engage in lawfare—are abusing the law by making 
unfounded accusations of illegality against their enemies. The lawrior poses 
as a disinterested legal actor who, more in sorrow than in anger, calls the 
world‘s attention to war crimes by a party who, just by coincidence, hap-
  
 2 Charles J. Dunlap, Commentary, Lawfare Today: A Perspective, 3 YALE J. INT‘L AFF. 
146, 146–47 (2008). 
 3 Id. at 146, attempts to define the term neutrally, as ―the strategy of using—or misus-
ing—law,‖ which treats law as ―a means that can be used for good or bad purposes.‖ This 
contrasts with Dunlap‘s earlier paper on lawfare, which agrees with some of the harshest 
lawfare critics that ―too often NGO positions look like political agendas,‖ and that ―there is 
an undeniable element of anti-Americanism in international law as it is developing today.‖ 
Charles J. Dunlap, Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st 
[Century] Conflicts, 2001, available at http://www.duke.edu/~pfeaver/dunlap.pdf (last vi-
sited Dec. 7, 2010).   
 4 National Defense Strategy of the United States (Mar. 2005) available at http://www. 
globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/nds-usa_mar2005.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 
 2010). See also Dunlap, supra note 2, at 148 (Notably, Gen. Dunlap explicitly reacted 
against this sentiment: ―To be clear, I condemn any interpretation of lawfare which would 
cast as terrorists those legitimately using the courts to challenge any governmental action.‖).  
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pens to be the adversary. Such accusations are factually or legally baseless. 
So lawfare is a double affront, against both martial virtue and legal virtue. 
Let me say a bit more about why lawfare offends against legal vir-
tue. Lawfare is a species of the politicization of law. Legitimate legal claims 
appeal to standards that transcend the particular case and the particular par-
ties. Legal claims are never supposed to be demands backed by nothing but 
the will of the parties—‖give it to me because I want it!‖—but rather de-
mands backed by claims under neutral standards, taking the form ―give it to 
me because I have a legal right to it!‖ Of course we are entitled to skeptic-
ism about the political neutrality of the law at all levels: legislation, access 
to legal institutions, judicial interpretation, and application of law to facts. 
But law can and does hold out the promise of at least relative neutrality and 
relative depoliticization—compared with partisan mud-slinging, dirty tricks, 
and armed conflict; and it is hard to see how law could fool so many people 
so much of the time if it never delivered on the promise. 
The lawfare critic accuses the enemy lawrior of politicizing law, 
presumably for base reasons. Specifically, the lawfare critic accuses the 
enemy lawrior of abusing international humanitarian law and international 
criminal law to hamstring or at least harass enemy military planners.5 The 
past decade has seen two major eruptions of the lawfare critique.6 The first 
was by the United States during the Bush Administration, and the second 
was by Israel and American supporters of Israel in the wake of the Gold-
stone Report. In the first case, the accusations were that the governments of 
―old Europe‖ and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) like the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) aimed to undermine U.S. tactics 
in the War on Terror for essentially political motives.7 Here, the accusation 
of lawfare was indirect: no one accused the ICRC or western Europeans of 
intentionally aiding al-Qaeda, although some lawfare critics insinuated that 
the Europeans might have a geopolitical agenda of hobbling U.S. military 
  
 5 I use the term ―international humanitarian law‖ (IHL) rather than the standard military 
phrase ―law of armed conflict‖ (LOAC) for two reasons. First, I use it to emphasize that I am 
talking about international rather than domestic law, and second, to emphasize that a great 
deal of IHL grows out of the humanitarian agenda of limiting the suffering and destructive-
ness of warfare to the extent possible. 
 6 By the term ―lawfare critique‖ I mean the attack on international humanitarian law and 
its institutions as a form of lawfare; and I use the phrase ―lawfare critic‖ to denote someone 
engaged in the lawfare critique. 
 7 For notable accusations of lawfare made against the ICRC, see David B. Rivkin Jr. & 
Lee A. Casey, Rule of Law: Friend or Foe?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 2005, at A23 (criticizing 
the ICRC study of customary international humanitarian law as politicized and calling for the 
United States to defund the ICRC); David B. Rivkin Jr., et al., Not Your Father’s Red Cross, 
NAT‘L REV. ONLINE, Dec. 20, 2004, http://crunchycon.nationalreview.com/articles/213182/ 
not-your-fathers-red-cross/david-b-rivkin-jr (last visited Dec. 7, 2010) (accusing the ICRC of 
abandoning its impartial role in favor of advocacy). 
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dominance.8 Rather, the accusation was that the humanitarian groups are the 
jihadis‘ useful idiots. The reaction to the Goldstone Report was different: 
here, the accusation was, in the words of journalist Jeffrey Goldberg, that 
Richard Goldstone was ―the chief of the hanging party‖ whose ―mandate . . 
. was to find Israel guilty.‖9 This is a more direct accusation of intentional 
and deliberate lawfare than in the American debate. 
Just as the accusation of lawfare is a species of the broader accusa-
tion of politicizing law—specifically, that lawriors politicize law for some-
one‘s military advantage—it is also a species of ad hominem argument. By 
unmasking the recourse to humanitarian law as lawfare on behalf of an in-
terested party‘s military goals, lawfare critics deflects attention from the 
substance of the legal claims to the self-interest and sneaky motives of the 
person entering them. Like all ad hominem arguments, the lawfare critique 
has the rhetorical function of diverting attention from what classical rhetoric 
called the logos of an argument—its substance—to its ethos—the character 
of the speaker.10 The logos in this case is the argument that soldiers have 
committed war crimes; the ethos is the insidious and militarized motives of 
making those accusations.  
Of course, ad hominem criticism is itself the primary technique of 
politicized argument. Lawfare critics are themselves engaged in lawfare. 
Not that critiques of lawfare are necessarily a form of lawfare, just as not all 
war crimes accusations are a form of lawfare. Sometimes an argument is 
just an argument. But the most conspicuous lawfare critics are suspicious of 
the claims of self-proclaimed humanitarian and human rights lawyers to be 
disinterested. Engaged in mortal combat against the lawriors, lawfare critics 
have no more use for disinterested inquiry than does a soldier on a battle-
field.11  
Some issues seem to lend themselves to politicized academic treat-
ment because they tap into high-stakes public controversies, however indi-
rectly. Some years ago, I was working on a law-and-literature paper about 
the trial scene in Aeschylus‘s Oresteia, and my research led to questions 
  
 8 Perhaps the paradigm text about the European agenda and its differences from that of 
the United States is ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE 
NEW WORLD ORDER (Vintage Books, 2004). 
 9 Jeffrey Goldberg, On That United Nations Report, THE ATLANTIC, Sept. 2009, available 
at http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2009/09/on-that-united-nations-report/ 
26777. 
 10 The source of the distinction is Aristotle, Rhetoric, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF 
ARISTOTLE 2152, 2155 (Jonathan Barnes ed. 1984), 1,2.1356a1-21. (The Barnes edition 
mistypes the marginal number as 1358a1.) 
 11 Here I have specifically in mind the ―Lawfare Project,‖ an organization that in 2010 
staged one-sided ―academic‖ conferences at major law schools to denounce the Goldstone 
Report and the threat lawfare supposedly poses to American interests. 
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about whether there has ever been a historical matriarchy.12 One famous 
1861 interpretation of the Oresteia maintains that its legend derives from an 
actual conquest of a matriarchal Greek society by patriarchal Dorian invad-
ers.13 Frederick Engels accepted this interpretation in The Origins of the 
Family, Private Property, and the State, and as a result it became official 
dogma in the Communist world.14 I discovered that it was virtually impossi-
ble to find classicists on either side of the question of historical matriarchy 
who were not caught up in Cold War polemics. It was difficult for an out-
sider to the debate, such as myself, who had no dog in the fight, to find 
scholarship that did not smell unreliable.15 Apparently, the Cold War sucked 
even an obscure question of anthropology and archaeology into a political 
vortex, and pulled the scholars in with it. Another example is the tiresome 
and endless debate about punitive damages and alleged American litigious-
ness and runaway juries. Some years ago I attended an academic conference 
on punitive damages with a distinguished speaker-list that was quite ba-
lanced between the ―pros,‖ the ―antis,‖ and the ―empiricists‖ who actually 
had data about the incidence of punitive damages. The morning the confe-
rence began, its dismayed organizer announced that the pro-business, anti-
punitive damages speakers had pulled out. It seems that the general counsel 
of a major insurance company had read the papers in draft and concluded 
that the empirical studies were too damning to the anti-punitive damages 
side. Therefore the conference must be delegitimized by appearing to be 
one-sided business bashing. She organized corporate clients to instruct their 
counsel on the speaker‘s program to pull out of the conference. The confe-
rence organizer was flabbergasted. As I recall, only one pro-business speak-
er remained. Today‘s lawfare debate has many of the earmarks of these oth-
er debates: the scholarship always contains veiled polemical subtext that 
outsiders to the debate can sense even if they cannot decode it.16 Ultimately, 
  
 12 AESCHYLUS, THE ORESTEIA, (Hugh Lloyd-Jones, trans., 1993). 
 13 FREDERICK ENGELS, THE ORIGINS OF THE FAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY, AND THE STATE: 
IN THE LIGHT OF THE RESEARCHES OF LEWIS H. MORGAN (Ernest Untermann trans., 1902). 
JOHAN JAKOB BACHOFEN, DAS MUTTERRECHT (1861) (Mutterrecht translates to ―Mother 
Right.‖). 
 14 ENGELS, supra note 13. 
 15 I finally found one scholarly article that actually gave a balanced presentation. Marilyn 
Arthur, Review Essay: Classics, 2 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 382 
(1976).The classic Marxist interpretation is GEORGE THOMSON, AESCHYLUS AND ATHENS: A 
STUDY IN THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DRAMA (Lawrence & Wishart 4th ed. 1973). 
 16 Of course, readers may wonder the same thing about this paper. To lift the veil on my 
own subtext, I devoted several years to criticizing the Bush administration for engaging in 
and legitimizing torture, and lawfare critics may regard such criticism as an instance of law-
fare. See, e.g., David Luban, The Torture Lawyers of Washington, in DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL 
ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007). I also criticized Bush Adminis-
tration legal positions on detentions in Guantánamo, in The War on Terrorism and the End of 
Human Rights, in WAR AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 51 (Verna V. Gehring ed., 2002). See also 
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readers who honestly want to form an opinion and who come to the scholar-
ship for insight rather than validation of prior political positions will be dis-
appointed. They will conclude, as I did reading the ―historical matriarchy‖ 
literature, that hardly any of it is trustworthy. Not only are the legal issues 
politicized, but the academic debates about them are as well. 
The lawfare critique is not simply that those accusing states of war 
crimes have ulterior motives, which would not be an interesting charge. Of 
course they have ulterior motives. Anyone who voluntarily has recourse to 
the institutions of the law has ulterior motives: nobody ever files a lawsuit 
out of disinterested curiosity in the answer to a legal question. In everyday 
litigation, we hardly think it noteworthy or morally condemnable to learn 
that a plaintiff has a self-interested motive for the suit; if she didn‘t, we 
might in fact deny her standing. Undoubtedly, the ICRC has its own institu-
tional interest in defending its interpretation of international humanitarian 
law. Undoubtedly, Hamas had ulterior motives in steering the Goldstone 
Commission to some witnesses rather than others, just as Israel had ulterior 
motives in hampering Goldstone‘s investigation. Any competent lawyer has 
strategic reasons behind her choice of which legal arguments she will ad-
vance, when she will advance them, and in which forum. If strategic, goal-
oriented planning behind legal arguments is the hallmark of lawfare, all 
litigation is like lawfare. The only difference is the specific military nature 
of the goal, that is, that legal success will constrain a state‘s military forces 
by declaring some of their tactics legally off-limits. The real issue, as in 
domestic litigation, is not whether parties have ulterior motives, but whether 
the ulterior motives can be backed with valid legal arguments—whether 
logos underlies ethos and pathos. To insinuate that advancing such argu-
ments is lawfare, and hence illegitimate, is to insinuate that law should nev-
er constrain armed might. Thus the radical critique of lawfare amounts to an 
assault on international humanitarian law and international criminal law as 
such. 
II.  CARL SCHMITT AS LAWFARE CRITIC 
I am interested in the intellectual genealogy of the lawfare critique. 
Is there a coherent philosophy behind the mistrust of humanitarian law as a 
tool or pretext for disarming a state‘s military? In my view, such a philoso-
phy exists in one of the most significant and famous works of political 
theory of the twentieth century, Carl Schmitt‘s 1932 essay The Concept of 
  
David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guantánamo, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1981 (2008) 
(criticizing U.S. officials for trying to undermine legal representations of Guantánamo detai-
nees, and arguing that these efforts may have been lawfare responding to perceived lawfare 
by the Guantánamo defense bar). Such criticism might also fall under hostile scrutiny from 
lawfare critics. I respond that sometimes an argument is just an argument. 
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the Political.17 Schmitt was a conservative jurist and philosopher during the 
Weimar Republic. He fell into eclipse after World War II because he had 
been a legal publicist for the Nazi Party, and had published some anti-
Semitic writings.18 In the 1970s, Schmitt went through a curious revival by 
theorists on the left, and, after 9/11, interest in him ratcheted up again, 
largely because of his writings that support untrammeled executive power in 
the face of emergency.19 Many writers noticed the ―Schmittian‖ character of 
the Bush Administration‘s constitutional arguments, and political theorist 
and commentator Alan Wolfe included in his 2009 book The Future of Li-
beralism a chapter bearing the wonderful title ―Mr. Schmitt Goes to Wash-
ington.‖20 Schmitt lived well into his 90s and was able to witness his own 
rehabilitation and indeed his ultimate recognition as a major political think-
er. And, like it or not, Schmitt is a major political thinker, as well as a po-
werfully seductive and stimulating writer. 
The fundamental proposition of The Concept of the Political is that 
properly understood, ―the political‖ refers solely to the friend-enemy dis-
  
 17 CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL (expanded ed. trans. George Schwab, 
2007). This expanded edition also contains Leo Strauss‘s Notes on Carl Schmitt, The Con-
cept of the Political (trans. J. Harvey Lomax), and Schmitt‘s 1929 paper The Age of Neutrali-
zations and Depoliticizations (trans. Matthias Konzett & John P. McCormick). The latter 
paper is essentially a continuation of The Concept of the Political, and Strauss‘s important 
comments on Schmitt refer to it. The edition also contains an extremely valuable introducto-
ry essay by Tracy B. Strong, Foreword: Dimensions of the New Debate around Carl Schmitt. 
 18 GOPAL BALAKRISHAN, THE ENEMY: AN INTELLECTUAL PORTRAIT OF CARL SCHMITT ( 
Verso Sept. 26, 2002). On Schmitt‘s anti-Semitic writings, see STEPHEN HOLMES, THE 
ANATOMY OF ANTILIBERALISM  38-39, 50-53 (1993). 
 19 SCHMITT, supra note 17.   
 20 ALAN WOLFE, THE FUTURE OF LIBERALISM 126 (2009). Strong‘s introductory essay to 
The Concept of the Political, supra note 17, offers an illuminating account of the twists and 
turns in the receptions of Schmitt. The connection between Schmitt, Bush Administration 
policies, and the lawfare critique was noted as long ago as 2005 by Scott Horton, who devel-
oped it in a terrific series of blog posts and articles: Scott Horton, The Return of Carl 
Schmitt, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 7, 2005), available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/11/ 
return-of-carl-schmitt.html; Scott Horton, Carl Schmitt and the Military Commissions Act of 
2006, BALKINIZATION (Oct. 16, 2006), available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/10/carl-
schmitt-and-military-commissions_16.html; Scott Horton, Carl Schmitt, the Dolchstoßle-
gende, and the Law of Armed Conflict, BALKINIZATION (Oct. 21, 2006), available at http:// 
balkin.blogspot.com/2006/10/carl-schmitt-dolchstolegende-and-law.html; Scott Horton, A 
Kinder, Gentler Lawfare, HARPER‘S MAG., Nov. 30, 2007, available at http://www.harpers. 
org/archive/2007/11/hbc-90001803; Scott Horton, State of Exception: Bush’s War on the 
Rule of Law, HARPER‘S MAG., July 2007, available at http://www.harpers.org/archive/2007/ 
07/0081595. Schmitt has been adopted by anti-terrorism hawks. See ERIC POSNER & ADRIAN 
VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 38 (2007) (pur-
porting to ―extract the marrow from Schmitt and throw away the bones‖); cf. Alice Ristroph, 
Professors Strangelove (review essay of Posner & Vermeule), 11 GREENBAG 2D 245, 248 
(2008) (describing their metaphor as ―probably not the best image with which to invoke a 
theorist associated with the Third Reich.‖). 
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tinction.21 Furthermore, ―[t]he friend and enemy concepts are to be unders-
tood in their concrete and existential sense, not as metaphors or symbols,‖22 
and ―[t]he friend, enemy, and combat concepts receive their real meaning 
precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing.‖23 
Schmitt does not mean that politics always involves physical warfare: ―War 
is neither the aim nor the purpose nor even the very content of politics. But 
as an ever present possibility, it is the leading presupposition which deter-
mines in a characteristic way human action and thinking and thereby creates 
a specifically political behavior.‖24 
Schmitt also insists that ―[t]he enemy in the political sense need not 
be hated personally‖; but that is irrelevant to whether we will kill him if 
necessary.25 We fight not out of personal hatred but because the enemy 
threatens our way of life. ―If such physical destruction of human life is not 
motivated by an existential threat to one‘s own way of life, then it cannot be 
justified. Just as little can war be justified by ethical and juristic norms.‖26 
The fallacy of liberalism for Schmitt lies in the thought that man is intrinsi-
cally good, so if we eradicate hatred we can eradicate enmity and killing. 
On the contrary, ―all genuine political theories presuppose man to be evil, 
i.e., by no means an unproblematic but a dangerous and dynamic being.‖27  
It follows from Schmitt‘s fundamental friend-enemy conception of 
politics that all political groupings are oppositional—no enemies, no poli-
tics. The political world is by definition a world of us and them, and a politi-
cal community ―which embraces the entire globe and all of humanity cannot 
exist.‖28 The ancient ideal of a cosmopolis, a community of all humanity, is 
an apolitical fiction, and the fact that one of them, the enemy, is just as hu-
man, just as decent, and just as lovable as one of us provides no argument 
against killing him. 
 Of course people will continue to invoke the ideals of ―humanity.‖ 
But in Schmitt‘s view, anyone who does so operates in bad faith. As he puts 
it in the most memorable line in this very memorable book, ―whoever in-
vokes humanity wants to cheat.‖29 Not that there is anything wrong with 
cheating—that‘s politics:  
That wars are waged in the name of humanity . . . has an especially inten-
sive political meaning. When a state fights its political enemy in the name 
of humanity, it is not a war for the sake of humanity, but a war wherein a 
  
 21 SCHMITT, supra note 17, at 26. 
 22 Id. at 27. 
 23 Id. at 33. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at 29. 
 26 Id. at 49. 
 27 Id. at 61. 
 28 Id. at 53. 
 29 Id. at 54. 
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particular state seeks to usurp a universal concept against its military op-
ponent
30
 
Humanitarianism is, in Schmitt‘s view, extraordinarily dangerous. Fighting 
on behalf of ―humanity‖ makes your enemy ―an outlaw of humanity‖ and 
allows you to do the most terrible things to him.31 A war to end all war—
‖the absolute last war of humanity‖—is ―necessarily unusually intense and 
inhuman because . . . it simultaneously degrades the enemy into  ...a mon-
ster that must not only be defeated but also utterly destroyed.‖32 
And the word ―humanity‖ is not the only polemical, political term 
masquerading as a lofty moral concept.  ―There are always concrete human 
groupings which fight other concrete human groupings in the name of jus-
tice, humanity, order, or peace. When being reproached for immorality and 
cynicism, the spectator of political phenomena can always recognize in such 
reproaches a political weapon used in actual combat.‖33 
―The political‖ is not a philosophical idea or indeed an idea of any 
sort: it is a concrete, existential reality. Political concepts have only polemi-
cal meanings. They may sound philosophical or universal, but in truth 
―[t]hey are focused on a specific conflict and are bound to a concrete situa-
tion; . . . and they turn into empty and ghostlike abstractions when this situa-
tion disappears.‖34 Strictly speaking, then, Schmitt denies the very possibili-
ty of political philosophy. There are only political jabs and thrusts disguised 
as philosophy. 
For Schmitt, indeed, the category of the political devours all other 
categories, not merely political philosophy. There is no escaping politics 
into a disinterested realm of any sort. 
Above all the polemical character determines the use of the word political 
regardless of whether the adversary is designated as nonpolitical (in the 
sense of harmless), or vice versa if one wants to disqualify or denounce 
him as political in order to portray oneself as nonpolitical (in the sense of 
purely scientific, purely moral, purely juristic, purely aesthetic, purely 
economic, or on the basis of similar purities) and thereby superior.
35
 
We can understand Schmitt‘s point through a contemporary example: de-
bates over climate change or the theory of evolution. Some people think that 
whether man-made greenhouse gasses cause dangerous climate change is a 
scientific question; so is the question of whether human beings evolved 
  
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. at 36. 
 33 Id. at 67. 
 34 Id. at 30. 
 35 Id. at 31–32. That includes the purely religious, as Schmitt makes clear. Id. at 39. God 
may be above politics but faith in God is not. 
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from nonhuman ancestors. But those who think that on scientific issues we 
should defer to science fail to understand that the concept of the political 
devours science along with everything else. If scientific conclusions would 
imply that we must change our way of life, we will reject the conclusions 
and, if necessary, destroy the scientists. If the scientists complain that at-
tacks on their character, integrity, or honesty are ―political,‖ we will (for 
political reasons) denounce their response as merely political.  
That is what Schmitt means by saying that ―the polemical character 
determines the use of the word political.‖ Even the word political is politi-
cal: we use it to smear and undermine the claims of our adversaries. ―Ter-
minological questions become . . . highly political.‖36 Then, after denounc-
ing the scientists‘ defense of themselves as political, we will continue to 
slime them, and try as hard as we can to get them fired, defunded, and si-
lenced. They may have thought they were answering a scientific, technical 
question. But in the world of politics there are no technical questions, only 
political questions. Hobbes recognized this when he wrote:  
I doubt not, but if it had been a thing contrary to any mans right of domi-
nion, or to the interest of men that have dominion, That the three Angles of 
a Triangle, should be equall to two Angles of a Square; that doctrine 
should have been, if not disputed, yet by the burning of all books of Geo-
metry, suppressed, as farre as he whom it concerned was able.
37
  
Of course Schmitt does not deny that that science, or art, or law, or geome-
try can be apolitical, provided political bodies find them harmless to their 
way of life; even more so if they find them useful in political conflicts. 
There is no denying that a state can sometimes gain political advantage by 
promoting a flourishing cultural scene. But politics remains primary in the 
sense that it is up to political actors to decide when an artist or scientist be-
comes politically dangerous; if they do, there will be no such thing as art for 
art‘s sake or science for the sake of knowledge. The scientists‘ protests of 
apolitical innocence will be condemned as an especially crafty political 
ruse. 
Notice that in the paragraph quoted above Schmitt includes the 
―purely juristic‖ as one of the polemical stances enemies can take when they 
pretend to be nonpolitical—as a way to be political. The ICRC claims it is 
making impartial, ―purely juristic‖ arguments about the laws of war.38 Law-
fare critics recognize that ICRC‘s claim to be purely juristic and nonpoliti-
  
 36 Id. at 31. 
 37 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 74, Ch. XI (Richard Tuck ed.). 
 38 See generally, David G. Chandler, The Road to Military Humanitarianism: How the 
Human Rights NGOs Shaped A New Humanitarian Agenda, HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY, 
available at http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/human_rights_quarterly/v023/23.3chandler.html# 
REF3 (describing the ICRC as being nonpolitical). 
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cal is simply an insidious way of being political, of waging lawfare against 
states with powerful armies. The ICRC pretends to be neutral—one of the 
tell-tale signs by which we recognize the enemy. In one of most significant 
sentences in his book, Schmitt writes: ―The high points of politics are simul-
taneously the moments in which the enemy is, in concrete reality, recog-
nized as the enemy.‖39 The lawfare critique is, in Schmitt‘s sense, a high 
point of politics. 
Schmitt denounces all ―neutralizations and depoliticizations,‖40 
which for him are the hallmarks of liberalism. There are no neutralizations: 
if you are not with us you are against us and we will destroy you: ―If a part 
of the population declares that it no longer recognizes enemies, then, de-
pending on the circumstance, it joins their side and aids them.‖41 You may 
not be interested in politics, but politics is interested in you. 
Is there any escape from the all-consuming quicksand of politics? 
Not according to Schmitt: ―If a people no longer possesses the energy or the 
will to maintain itself in the sphere of politics, the latter will not thereby 
vanish from the world. Only a weak people will disappear.‖42 To retreat 
from politics invites annihilation; to yearn for a respite from politics is to 
yearn for death. 
One additional idea, not very apparent in The Concept of the Politi-
cal, comes out in some of Schmitt‘s later works, particularly his 1962 lec-
tures on what we would today call terrorism, The Theory of the Partisan: 
Intermediate Commentary on the Concept of the Political, and his 1950 
book on international law, The Nomos of the Earth. It would be a mistake to 
think that Schmitt rejects the idea of laws governing warfare, or, for that 
matter, that he idealizes war and rejects humanitarian restraint. Rather, he 
believes that the ability to ―bracket‖ war—to limit it according to the jus in 
bello principles of non-combatant immunity and avoidance of unnecessary 
suffering—is a historically contingent achievement of European public law, 
restricted to sovereigns who treat war as akin to a duel among gentlemen. 
The jus publicum Europaeanum collapsed through the rise of America, the 
advent of air-power that detaches warfare from territory, and non-state war-
riors who ruthlessly wage absolute war. With it collapsed the possibility of 
―bracketed‖ warfare. 
 At this point, all the pieces of the argument are in place. A world 
divided into friends and enemies locked in existential struggle with real, 
non-metaphorical killing as the permanent backdrop. A critique of ―humani-
tarianism‖ as a political ruse. A contempt of liberals for their weakness and 
their failure to recognize death struggle as man‘s fate. A thoroughgoing 
  
 39 SCHMITT, supra note 17, at 67. 
 40 See id. at 69, 80, and 89. 
 41 Id. at 51. 
 42 Id. at 53. 
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skepticism about neutral, apolitical arguments of any sort, including legal 
arguments. An insistence that even those who think they can transcend poli-
tics into a more neutral, objective realm of science, law, economics, or phi-
losophy are aiding the enemy and can be treated as enemies. An insistence 
that laws of armed conflict, particularly laws protecting non-combatants, 
depend on reciprocity among states belonging to the classical order of Eu-
ropean public law, and that war against terrorists can never be bracketed.  
III.  SCHMITT, STRAUSS, AND THE QUESTION OF INFLUENCE 
Did Carl Schmitt actually exert any influence on contemporary law-
fare critics? I do not know the answer—you would have to ask them. On its 
face, the proposition seems unlikely: Schmitt was barely discussed outside 
academic circles, or even much discussed within academic circles, until the 
middle of the millennial decade. The current edition of The Concept of the 
Political appeared in 2007; his influential Political Theology was out of 
print in English for a decade before its 2006 reprint; and the English transla-
tions of most of Schmitt‘s other books appeared after 2005.43 A Lexis 
search reveals five law review references to Schmitt between 1980 and 
1990; 114 between 1990 and 2000; and 420 since 2000, with almost twice 
as many in the last five years as the previous five. 
One possible connection, noted in 2005 by Scott Horton, is through 
Leo Strauss.44 Strauss‘s youthful essay on The Concept of the Political is 
included in the book‘s English translation.45 Strauss applauded Schmitt‘s 
critique of liberalism enthusiastically, and his only criticisms of Schmitt 
were that Schmitt masked the extent of his nausea (Strauss‘s word) over 
pacifism and liberalism, and refrained from following his own argument to 
the inevitable conclusion that humanitarian ideals are not merely unrealistic, 
but are actually immoral and must be combated.46 Strauss‘s essay demanded 
a less kind, less gentle Schmitt—one might say that Strauss‘s essay is 
Schmitt without a humanitarian face. Strauss, unlike Schmitt, has exerted a 
powerful and lasting influence on American politics, in no small part be-
cause so many Straussians have occupied positions in government, journal-
ism, and the neoconservative movement.47 Neoconservatives have been 
among the most vigorous lawfare critics. 
  
 43 See ELLEN KENNEDY, CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE:  CARL SCHMITT IN WEIMAR 2 (Duke 
Univ. Press 2004); Craig McFarlane, Carl Schmitt in English, THEORIA, http://www.theoria. 
ca/research/ (updated Nov. 1, 2008). 
 44 See Horton, The Return of Carl Schmitt, supra note 20. 
 45 SCHMITT, supra note 17, at 97. 
 46 See id. at 116 (―nausea‖), 119–20 (discussing Schmitt‘s concealment of his moral criti-
que of humanitarian ideals). 
 47 See, e.g., CATHERINE H. ZUCKERT & MICHAEL ZUCKERT, THE TRUTH ABOUT LEO 
STRAUSS: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (The Chicago Univ. Press 
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But I am not arguing for a causal influence of Schmitt on lawfare 
critics, because I cannot demonstrate that it is there. Rather, I am arguing 
that Schmitt‘s philosophy offers the best articulation I have found of the 
lawfare critique. It may be time for lawfare critics to take ownership of their 
ancestor. 
IV.  SCHMITT‘S MISREPRESENTATION OF POLITICS 
What can be said in response to Schmitt?48 A full-fledged assess-
ment of Schmitt‘s views lies beyond my aim in this short paper. But I would 
like to raise some points that bear specifically on the lawfare debate. 
Start with Schmitt‘s insistence that the term ―political‖ is itself po-
lemical.49 This amounts to a hidden, self-referential caution to readers that 
Schmitt‘s own concept of the political is polemical. It is not neutral, objec-
tive, academic, or philosophical. It is slanted, biased, and loaded. Schmitt 
tells us that much, but he never holds the mirror to himself and tell us exact-
ly how his concept is loaded. 
My answer is that even though ―that‘s just political!‖ is often an ac-
cusation, the word ―political‖ has positive associations in our tradition, 
which Schmitt cunningly trades on. Aristotle proclaimed that man is the 
zoôn politikon, the political animal, and argued that the political life is the 
best and freest life for man as a practical being.50 It would seem to follow, 
then, that pacifists or humanitarians who yearn for the end of bloody friend-
enemy polarities want to destroy something essential to human beings. At 
several points in The Concept of the Political, duly noted by Strauss, 
Schmitt hints, without actually saying, that even if it were possible to ex-
punge deadly friend-enemy dyads from the world it would not be desirable. 
It would shrink the meaningfulness of human life to mere entertainment; life 
would at most be interesting, but never meaningful.51 Strauss seizes on these 
hints that a depoliticized world would be a sub-human world and insists that 
this is Schmitt‘s actual view.52 
We hear in Strauss echoes of Nietzsche‘s contempt for ―the last 
man,‖ the post-dangerous man, the timid bourgeois—about whom Schmitt 
  
2006); SHADIA B. DRURY, LEO STRAUSS AND THE AMERICAN RIGHT (St. Martin‘s Press 1999); 
ANNE NORTON, LEO STRAUSS AND THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN EMPIRE (Yale Univ. Press 
(2004) (discussing Strauss‘s influence). 
 48 Other than noting his disagreeable career as a Nazi and anti-Semite. See Strong, supra 
note 17, at ix-x; HOLMES, supra note 18, at 38-39; BALAKRISHAN, supra note 18. 
 49 See SCHMITT, supra note 17, at 31-33. 
 50 Aristotle, Politics, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 10, at 1987, 
1.2.1253a2.  Aristotle claims at the beginning of the Politics that the state (the polis) ―aims at 
good in a greater degree than any other [community], and at the highest good.‖ Id. at 1986, 
1.1.1252a5-63. 
 51 SCHMITT, supra note 17, at 35; Strauss, supra note 17, at 53. 
 52 Strauss, supra note 17, at 115–17. 
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too speaks with contempt.53 Without politics, man would not be man. He 
would be a tamed puppy. Schmitt does not quite say this, but he hints at it: 
―Were this entity [the friend-enemy grouping] to disappear, . . . then the 
political itself would disappear.‖54 That sounds pretty scary if you have pos-
itive Aristotelian associations with politics, but in fact, Schmitt‘s assertion 
is a mere tautology. He has defined the concept of the political as the friend-
enemy grouping, so by definition if the friend-enemy grouping disappears 
the political disappears. So what? The only thing that makes this assertion 
sound significant is the set of associations—absent from Schmitt‘s friend-
enemy construct—that makes us think the political is a form of community 
rather than antipathy, and therefore that the political is indispensible to 
meaningful human life. 
Among these associations is the positive, constructive side of poli-
tics, the very foundation of Aristotle‘s conception of politics, which Schmitt 
completely ignores. Politics, we often say, is the art of the possible. It is the 
medium for organizing all human cooperation. Peaceable civilization, civil 
institutions, and elemental tasks such as collecting the garbage and deliver-
ing food to hungry mouths all depend on politics. Of course, peering into 
the sausage factory of even such mundane municipal institutions as the town 
mayor‘s office will reveal plenty of nasty politicking, jockeying for position 
and patronage, and downright corruption. Schmitt sneers at these as ―banal 
forms of politics, . . . all sorts of tactics and practices, competitions and in-
trigues‖ and dismisses them contemptuously as ―parasite- and caricature-
like formations.‖55 The fact is that Schmitt has nothing whatever to say 
about the constructive side of politics, and his entire theory focuses on ene-
mies, not friends. In my small community, political meetings debate issues 
as trivial as whether to close a street and divert the traffic to another street. 
It is hard to see mortal combat as even a remote possibility in such disputes, 
and so, in Schmitt‘s view, they would not count as politics, but merely ad-
ministration. Yet issues like these are the stuff of peaceable human politics. 
Schmitt, I have said, uses the word ―political‖ polemically—in his 
sense, politically. I have suggested that his very choice of the word ―politi-
cal‖ to describe mortal enmity is tendentious, attaching to mortal enmity 
Aristotelian and republican associations quite foreign to it. But the more 
basic point is that Schmitt‘s critique of humanitarianism as political and 
polemical is itself political and polemical. In a word, the critique of lawfare 
is itself lawfare. It is self-undermining because to the extent that it succeeds 
in showing that lawfare is illegitimate, it de-legitimizes itself. 
What about the merits of Schmitt‘s critique of humanitarianism? 
His argument is straightforward: either humanitarianism is toothless and 
  
 53 Id. at 51 and 62.  
 54 Id. at 45. 
 55 Id. at 30. 
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apolitical, in which case ruthless political actors will destroy the humanita-
rians; or else humanitarianism is a fighting faith, in which case it has suc-
cumbed to the political but made matters worse, because wars on behalf of 
humanity are the most inhuman wars of all.  Liberal humanitarianism is 
either too weak or too savage. 
The argument has obvious merit. When Schmitt wrote in 1932 that 
wars against ―outlaws of humanity‖ would be the most horrible of all, it is 
hard not to salute him as a prophet of Hiroshima. The same is true when 
Schmitt writes about the League of Nations‘ resolution to use ―economic 
sanctions and severance of the food supply,‖56 which he calls ―imperialism 
based on pure economic power.‖57 Schmitt is no warmonger—he calls the 
killing of human beings for any reason other than warding off an existential 
threat ―sinister and crazy‖58—nor is he indifferent to human suffering. 
But international humanitarian law and criminal law are not the 
same thing as wars to end all war or humanitarian military interventions, so 
Schmitt‘s important moral warning against ultimate military self-
righteousness does not really apply.59 Nor does ―bracketing‖ war by huma-
nitarian constraints on war-fighting presuppose a vanished order of Euro-
pean public law. The fact is that in nine years of conventional war, the Unit-
ed States has significantly bracketed war-fighting, even against enemies 
who do not recognize duties of reciprocity.60 This may frustrate current law-
fare critics who complain that American soldiers in Afghanistan are being 
forced to put down their guns. Bracketing warfare is a decision—Schmitt 
might call it an existential decision—that rests in part on values that tran-
scend the friend-enemy distinction. Liberal values are not alien extrusions 
into politics or evasions of politics; they are part of politics, and, as Stephen 
Holmes argued against Schmitt, liberalism has proven remarkably strong, 
not weak.61  We could choose to abandon liberal humanitarianism, and that 
would be a political decision.  It would simply be a bad one. 
 
  
 56 Id. at 79. 
 57 Id. at 78. 
 58 Id. at 48. 
 59 David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29 YALE J. INT‘L L. 85 (2004). 
 60 See generally, MARK OSIEL, THE END OF RECIPROCITY (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009) 
(arguing that there are reasons beyond reciprocity for maintaining humanitarian norms). 
 61 HOLMES, supra note 18, at 57-58. Holmes reminds us rather dryly that it was the liberal 
states that won World War I. Id. at 48. 
